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BOOK REVIEWS
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY. By Kenneth
Culp Davis. Baton Rouge, Lousiana: Louisiana State University
Press. 1969. Pp. xii, 233. $8.50.
The words "preliminary inquiry" suggest a pioneering work,
promising fresh approaches to perennial problems. Maximum ex-
pectations are generated when the author of the inquiry is Kenneth
Culp Davis, whose pullulating brain has propagated progeny pro-
digiously throughout the literature of administrative law. Profes-
sor Davis has indicated in his earlier writings that he has no time
for the elucidation of the obvious,' and with his deep understanding
of administrative law, jurisprudence, and the behavioral sciences,
the reader can justifiably expect no less than a ground-breaking es-
say.2
With his varied background affording him an enviable vantage
point, Professor Davis has obtained a panoramic view of the legal
system which enables him to conclude correctly that the great major-
ity of research on the exercise of discretion is nothing more than
drivel which rehashes the ideas of earlier thinkers while avoiding
the difficult issues that cry out for clarification. This perceptive
observation suggests a broad approach to discretionary justice simi-
lar to that taken by general systems theorists such as Ludwig von
1 "Financial support is, in my opinion, unnecessary to make the discovery that be-
havioral science has so far made contributions to administrative law which add up to
exactly zero." Davis, Behavioral Science and Administrative Law, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 137,
137-38 (1964). See also note 3 infra.
2 It is thus no surprise that Discretionary justice has already been acclaimed as a
significant and creative work. See Schulz, Jr., Book Review, 21 AD. L. REV. 411 (1969).
3 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY vi-vii (1969).
A building analogy is one of Davis' favorites. In his scathing attack on a piece by
Grundstein [Administrative Law and the Behavioral and Management Sciences, 17
J. LEGAL ED. 121 (1964)] he writes:
The amazing fundamental of the Grundstein presentation is that he never
even attempts to show that any single tool he talks about will be useful
in constructing a building. The end product is neither a building nor a tool,
but it is no more than a lot of talk about the possibility of thinking about tools
and some excitement about tools that he says have been useful for building
entirely different kinds of buildings. Davis, supra note 1, at 148.
It is interesting to note that Davis did find that "Lindblom's thinking [citing
Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. AD. REv. 79 (1959)] may
well be on a track that will lead somewhere if he stays on it," id. at 147, but failed
himself to follow up on Lindblom's later elaboration of his ideas. See D. BRAYBROOKE
& C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROC-
ESS 81-111 (1963). The strategy of disjointed incrementalism might have been a useful
conceptual tool for Davis. See id. at 170. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 20-26.
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Bertalanffy4 - an approach quite appropriate for analysis of com-
plex decision-making processes.5 Professor Davis, however, does
not follow such a path: indeed, he curiously avoids discussion of
policy formulation, social justice, judicial discretion, and juror dis-
cretion - all matters inherent in a general systems approach.6 , He
opens instead with a quotation from William Pitt: "Where law
ends, tyranny begins. ' 7  This cleverly begs the question because
where law ends, discretion begins, and discretion may be exercised
justly.
There are of course difficult definitional problems posed by an
inquiry dealing with justice and discretion. In both instances a con-
cept is involved which "is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged,
[but) ... the skin of a living thought [which] ... may vary greatly
in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
4 See L VON BERTALANFFY, ROBOTS, MEN AND MINDS (1967).
5 Modern systems theory might have provided a helpful perspective function for
Professor Davis. It offers a useful scheme for resolving the locus problem [see A.
KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 78-80 (1964)], as well as for synthesis generally
[see Rapoport, General Systems Theory, 15 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 452 (1968); W. BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY
(1967)] by offering a "more flexible theoretical structure" [D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS
ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 21 (1965)] than other existing models. The theory
can claim at least the following virtues: (1) It meets the criticisms aimed at much of
contemporary behavioral science theory for failing to deal adequately with morphogen-
esis, deviance, and conflict, as well as morphosis, conformity, and cooperation. Most of
the objections directed at functionalism and the equilibrium and organic models are
met by the systems model. (2) The systems model deals with wholes, organization,
teleology, goal seeking, and directiveness. (3) Focusing on systems and processes
results in a broader perspective that encompasses more aspects of complex phenomena.
This in turn enhances the facility for analysis of multivariate and polycentric problems.
(4) The systems perspective may provide a gestalt or veritable periodic table for theory
construction and thus aid immeasurably in integrating many areas of study and in ex-
posing theoretical lacunae. See generally C. CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMS APPROACH
(1968). For a critical analysis, see R. BOGUSLAW, THE NEW UTOPIANS: A STUDY OF
SYSTEM DESIGN AND SociAL CHANGE (1965). There are certain passages in Discre-
tionary Justice where a systems approach as envisioned by C. West Churchman would
seem especially relevant. For illustrative examples, see K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at
100-02, 104-05, 158-59, 232.
6 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 6. The omission of a consideration of social justice is
especially interesting in light of Professor Davis' earlier observation that:
[A]dministrarive law research deals with the problems of practitioners and
with the problems of the government and that neither set of problems is sub-
ordinated to the other. Some administrative law research emphasizes fairness
to private parties; other administrative law research emphasizes governmental
effectiveness; the best administrative law research emphasizes the problem of
accommodating the needs of fairness to the needs of effectiveness. Davis,
supra note 1, at 153.
7 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 3. The quotation is from the famous speech made by
the Earl of Pitt on January 9, 1770, in the House of Lords. In the same speech Pitt ob-
severed that "[u]nlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it." A
century later, Lord Acton in a letter to Bishop Creighton (1887) restated the idea more
strongly: 'Tower tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely."
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which it is used." 8  In dealing with such concepts we are in a pos-
ture similar to that of the six Hindu blind men who, after "seeing"
an elephant for the first time gave six different reports as to its na-
ture - it was like a wall, a snake, a spear, a tree, a fan, and a rope.'
So too the nature of our view of discretion and justice depends on
our perspective ° and the context within which contact is attempted.
Discretion is not a thing, and short of reification, it makes sense to
speak of discretion only relative to situations where the decision
maker is acting under constraints in choosing among the alternative
courses of action open to him." Driving home his point concerning
the dearth of creative research, Professor Davis defines discretion in
these terms: "A public officer has discretion whenever the effec-
tive limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among pos-
sible courses of action or inaction."' 2
Although lamentably absent from the compendious mass of mate-
rial presented in Discretionmy justice, alternative definitions are
possible. 3 Frequently discretion refers to a situation where "the
8 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
9 See Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 266 (1950).
The difficulties inherent in defining "law" have often been noted. "We speak of
practicing law, as teaching it, as deciding it; and not one of us can say what law means."
B. CARDOZO, Jurisprudence, in SELECTED WRITINGS 7, 43 (M. Hall ed. 1947). "Those
of us who have learned humility have given over the attempt to define law." Radin,
A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARv. L REV. 1141, 1145 (1938). "Few questions
concerning human society have been asked with such persistence and answered by seri-
ous thinkers in so many diverse, strange, and even paradoxical ways as the question
'what is law?' " H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 1 (1961). For a survey of
significant definitions, see P. DIESING, REASON IN SoCIETY 127-28 (1962); H. CAIRNS,
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 556 (1949).
10 Alfred Korzybski suggests that the phenomenon called the "color" red would be
defined quite differently depending on the perspective of the viewer.
A reactionary would call it a 'Bolshevik' ... a Bolshevik would say 'My color'
... a color-blind person would say 'such a thing does not exist' ... a Dalton-
ist would say 'that is green' ... a metaphysician would say 'that is the soul of
whiskey' . . . an historian would say 'that is the color of the ink with which
human history has been written' . . . an uneducated person would say 'that
is the color of blood' . . . the modern scientist would say 'it is the light of
such and such wave length'...." A. KORZYESKI, MANHOOD OF HUMANITY
51 (1921).
11 Decision making is often defined in terms almost synonymous with Davis' idea
of discretion: "[D)ecision making is that thinking which results in the choice among
alternative courses of action .... " Taylor, Decision Making and Problem Solving, in
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 48 (J. March ed. 1965).
12 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 4.
13 This naturally implies that definitions are not true or false, rather useful or use-
less. The difficulty confronting the verbal realist who seeks the true definition of jus-
tice or discretion is apparent. How does one discover the essence of justice? See text
accompanying note 19 intra. The approach of conceptual pragmatism appears more
appropriate. See I. HILL, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 295-96 (1961);
H. KANTOROWIcZ, THE DEFINITION OF LAw 5, 90 n.8 (A. Campbell ed. 1958);
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standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically
but demand the use of judgment." 14 In this sense, discretion exists
no matter how precisely the standard is stated since it is always sub-
ject to administrative interpretation.' 5 Discretion may also refer to
situations where an official or institution like the Supreme Court,
is not subject to review.16 Or the term may refer to situations where
an official is authorized to act in accordance with his own judgment
without regard to an official standard.17  Dean Pound defines dis-
cretion as "[a]n authority conferred by law to act in certain condi-
tions or situations in accordance with an official's or an official
agency's own considered judgment and conscience. It is an ideal
of morals belonging to the twilight zone between law and morals.' 8
Esoteric mumblings such as the above only serve to emphasize the
incisive simplicity of Professor Davis' encapsulation of discretion's
very essence.
Thus having exhausted the subject of discretion, the text turns
to the even more imposing task of identifying justice. And what a
perplexing problem that is!
If justice is the product of a system of rules, then a computer might
replace fallible hairless biped judges that blush, empathize, and
engage in various similar "subjective" activities .... It is possible
that "justice" subsumes a complex of ineffable ideas and interrela-
tionships incapable of expression in linear form, such that just as
the contrapuntal harmony of a Bach fugue can never be rendered
on a solo bassoon, justice cannot issue full-grown in computer out-
put.' 9
Refusing to chance unnecessary entanglement in this esoteric mo-
rass, Professor Davis informs the reader that "this essay is concerned
primarily with a portion of justice - with that portion.., of justice
which pertains to individual parties."2  This circumspect formula-
tion accurately foreshadows the remainder of the text wherein the
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLuM. L REV.
809, 835-36 (1935).
14 Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L REV. 14, 32 (1967).
:i See J. ROUCEK, SOCIAL CONTROL 87-88 (1947).
16 In many ways all decision makers are subject to review, although not of a formal
or official type. Judges are subject to professional criticism that is virtually institu-
tionalized. That administrators are not subject to a similar form of critical review was
one reason that Dean Pound was so concerned with "administrative absolutism." See
Pound, Administrative Agencies and the Law, 2 WOMEN LAwYERS J. 6 (1945).
17 See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 33-35.
18IL POUND, CIMINAL Jusvlc IN AMERICA 926 (1930).
19 Lewis, The High Court: Final... But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 528,
549-50 (1968).
20 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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reader is apprised of how "to find the optimum degree [of discre-
tion and justice] in each set of circumstances. ' 21 We are first made
privy to the fact that today there is too much discretion exercised by
administrators. Some is necessary, but in many instances the exist-
ing discretion should be governed or guided by rules. Davis as-
tutely observes that this optimum degree of constraint can be
achieved by appropriately confining, 22 structuring, and checking dis-
cretion.
Although the legislature cannot always draft a statute that will
confine by providing a complete guide to action,23 legislatures "are
almost always flagrantly deficient in failing to correct the adminis-
trative assumption of discretionary power which is illegal or of
doubtful legality. Perhaps the greatest single area of discretionary
power which legislative bodies should cut back is the power of the
police to nullify legislation through non-enforcement or partial en-
forcement .... ,,24 Thus, since the legislatures are deficient in meet-
ing the problem, Professor Davis advises us that the appropriate
confining and structuring of discretion will occur only when admin-
21 Id. at 4. Of course, Julius Stone's astute observation concerning confining of
administrative discretion is apropos:
[I~t is easy to demand the maximum possible of "definiteness" and "neutral-
ity" of "principles." The real question lies in what is possible. Even in the
judicial exegesis of legal precepts we saw these limits to be severe. They
must obviously be more so when administrative tribunals are asked to capture,
in verbal formulations viable from case to case in a rapidly changing situa-
tion, the adjustments between all the potentially conflicting policies which
must be simultaneously pursued. J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW
AND JUSTICE 721 (1966).
22 "By confining is meant fixing the boundaries and keeping discretion within
them." K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 55.
23 This follows when we consider the reasons why administrative agencies are chosen
for effectuating governmental policy: (1) The required action may be too complex, or
may require too much factual investigation, for effective legislative action; (2) the ac-
tion presents conflicting interests, either between individuals or between an individual
and the government, which the summary methods of the executive process cannot
appropriately resolve; and (3) in addition to the conflict of interest, there is something
which makes a purely judicial resolution of the conflict unsatisfactory. See Gardner,
The Administrative Process, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW (M.
Paulsen ed. 1959). See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, Reasons for Establishment of Ad-
ministrative Agencies, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1-7 (1960). Sometimes it is true
that poor draftsmanship creates a situation where unnecessary discretion is exercised.
See Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1113
(1952).
24 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 55. Others have disagreed: "With limited exceptions,
the attention of the legislature should be directed essentially to the need, through further
legislation, for altering the policy standards, procedural machinery or budgetary allot-
ment. In administering the act, the agency is to be free from legislative 'interference.' "
Levy, Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies, 36 A.B.A.J. 236 (1950).
See also Jones, "Oversight" Function of Congressional Standing Committees, 34 A.B.A.J.
1018 (1948).
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istrators resort more frequently to the use of their rule-making
power.25  However, this does not mean that administrative rules
must arise from adjudicated cases or be expounded as totally ab-
stract general rules. Administrators may state a rule "in the form
of (1) a hypothetical set of facts, (2) a statement of the problem
raised by the facts, (3) an indication of the agency's answer to the
problem, and, when appropriate, (4) a statement of the agency's
reasons for its position."2 6  Also, whenever administrators fail to
propound appropriate rules by any of the above available methods,
the courts can provide the needed incentive by establishing a judi-
cial requirement that "administrators having power that is unguided
by meaningful statutory standards must within a reasonable time
issue meaningful rules which will properly confine their discretion-
ary power in individual cases."27
These unique - and frankly intriguing - suggestions are but-
tressed by the observation that the structuring of administrative dis-
cretion is best accomplished by use of seven instruments: Plans,
policy statements, rules, findings, reasons, precedents that are all
open, and fair informal procedure.28  "Openness is a natural enemy
of arbitrariness, a natural ally in the fight against injustice. 29
Fairness in informal procedure is perhaps "fifty or a hundred times
as important as fairness of formal procedure both in number of
parties and amount involved."80  Only the wise men of Gotham
would find fault with these suggestions.
The subject of checking discretion is succinctly summarized by
Professor Davis as follows:
Checking discretion. American government is stronger in
checking discretion than in confining or structuring it. An out-
standing need is for establishing a system of supervising decisions
2 5 See K. DAvIs, supra note 3, at 56-57. One author has characterized the inade-
quacies of the democratic institutions in the following terms:
That area where functional limitations make it impossible for the legislature
to give precise guidance for administrative action, and where similar limita-
tions prevent effective legislative and judicial oversight, represents the hard
core of the challenge which administrative power presents to the democratic
institutions.... Insofar as external controls on administration are here im-
practicable, we must obviously depend on administrative self-controL J.
STONE, supra note 21, at 701.
2 6 K. DAVIs, supra note 3, at 61.
271d. at 221.
28d. at 98.
291d. at 226.
30 Id. at 228.
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of local prosecutors, perhaps in each instance by a state attorney
general.
The American assumption that prosecutors' discretion should not be
judicially reviewable developed when executive functions were gen-
erally unreviewable. The assumption is in need of reexamination
in the light of the twentieth-century discovery that courts can re-
view executive action to protect against abuses while at the same
time avoiding judicial assumption of the executive power. The rea-
sons for judicial review of prosecutors' discretion are stronger than
for such review of much administrative discretion that is customar-
ily reviewable. The whole problem of possible judicial review of
prosecutors' discretion is in need of a full study.31
At the national level, the author conceptualizes a new federal
tribunal providing for inexpensive review of administrative action.
By eliminating needless barriers to this forum, such as standing,
ripeness, etc., he foresees the expansion of both administrative and
judicial review beyond their present narrow confines.3 2
The reader will find Discretionary Justice a veritable storehouse
of new ideas and approaches, documented by concrete examples of
egregious abuse of discretion by federal and state agencies. The
best evaluation of the work is offered by Professor Davis himself:
31 Id. at 228-29. It has long been noted that police and prosecutors exercise dis-
cretion. A variety of reasons are offered: (1) There are budgetary limitations that lead
to selective enforcement of the law. The courts have recognized this as a valid basis
for exercise of discretion:
[The [police] commissioner is bound to use the discretion with which he
is clothed. He is charged not alone with the execution of the liquor laws
of the State within the City of Detroit, but is likewise charged with the sup-
pression of all crime and the conservation of the peace. To enable him to
perform the duties imposed upon him by law, he is supplied with certain
limited means. It is entirely obvious that he must exercise a sound discre-
tion as to how those means shall be applied for the good of the community.
Gowan v. Smith, 157 Mich. 443, 473, 122 N.W. 286, 297 (1909).
See Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC,
355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958). See also Hall, Police Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND.
L.J. 133, 149-50 (1953). (2) The guilty party may have valuable information as an
informer that justifies, in the eyes of the police, not invoking the criminal process.
See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informers, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provo-
cateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951). (3) Racial factors may influence the exercise of
discretion. See W. KEPHART, RACIAL FACTORS AND URBAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
66 (1957). (4) The victim may not want a prosecution of the suspect. Compare, e.g.,
Taylor v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 160, 232 P. 963 (1925), with State v. Astin, 106 Wash.
336, 180 P. 394 (1919). (5) Other reasons include ambiguity in the law and incon-
sistency between the law, morality, and behavior. As to the latter, T. W. Arnold has
written: "Most unenforced criminal laws survive in order to satisfy established modes of
conduct. They are unenforced because we want to continue our conduct, and unre-
pealed because we want to preserve our morals." T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT 160 (1935).
32 "It is no secret that Davis is an expansionist when it comes to judicial review
so it is no surprise that he advocates that the doctrines of standing and ripeness be
simplified .... " Schulz, Jr., supra note 2 at 418.
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Even if my suggested approach is fully accepted, most of the think-
ing has yet to be done.
The need for more descriptive and critical studies of the realities
about the administration of government programs seems to be
urgent.
We need a new jurisprudence that will encompass all of justice,
not just the easy half of it.3a
OVID C. LEWIS*
OIL: THE BIGGEST BUSINESS. By Christopher Tugendhat. New
York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. 1968. Pp. xviii, 318. $6.95.
The famous arctic explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson once said,
"[I]f the average American or European university graduate had
ten ideas about the Arctic, nine of them were wrong."1 The same
remark could, today, be made concerning the American public's
understanding of the international oil industry. This leviathan of
the business world affects most of us continuously, yet the industry's
complexity militates against our comprehension of its operations.
We recognize its products as an energy source, but general aware-
ness is lacking concerning the importance of oil and gas as ingre-
clients of a variety of chemical products ranging from pharmaceuti-
cals to insecticides, from shower curtains to detergents. The very
size of these industrial monsters means that their influence on gov-
ernmental policies is substantial. Among all of the world's corpora-
tions, only three companies outside the oil industry, General Motors,
U.S. Steel, and Unilever, can begin to compare in size to the "big
seven."2 These corporations are so large and powerful that even an
analogy to that giant of classic corporate economics, the cartel, fails
to adequately characterize their nature. The seven companies are
powerful enough to deal with sovereign nations as equals, and with
all but the largest states they are more than equal. In order to
achieve a greater measure of equality in dealing with these giant
corporations, several nations including Venezuela, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, Qutar, Libya, Indonesia, and Abu Dhabi have
joined together as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
33 K. DAvis, supra note 3, at 232-33.
*Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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tries (OPEC). In view of the above, the discipline of political
science would perhaps be the best analytical framework within
which to examine the behavior of these companies, for in most
functions their behavior more closely resembles that of a sovereign
state than that of a business enterprise.
Most oil companies both cooperate and compete fiercely with
their competitors. Small firms are subject to the brutal tactics of an
economic jungle, and yet many small firms exist and even prosper
with the assistance of the giants. The foregoing portrait of the oil
corporation as a political entity only partially explains why it is that
oil operations are conducted in an environment characterized by such
contradictions. Mr. Tugendhat feels that the desire to earn a profit,
the only constant in the industry's behavior, provides the key to ex-
plaining individual corporations' seemingly schizophrenic actions.
When combined with corporate reticence to provide information
concerning their activities, this random behavior makes the indus-
try fascinating but inscrutable. The author's reference to the tanker
market as the biggest floating crap game in the world could appro-
priately be applied to the entire industry.'
The author's treatment of the oil corporations' activities has the
effect of likening the industry to the small family farmer. The
firms may be large, but, nevertheless, they must constantly face
commerical annihilation from forces not subject to their control.
The pursuit of profits leads them to tack rapidly as they react to
external pressures. It would be a repetition of the book to discuss
all of the incongruous attributes of these companies, but two are
worthy of mention. The largest single problem of the industry is
overproduction which, because of the inelastic demand for petro-
leum, results in depressed prices. Every large company, however,
expends substantial effort and money to find additional reserves
even though more oil is not needed. Given the political instability
of most of the present major producing regions, each company fears
losing its source of supply. And even if the supply was assured,
market proximity is of such economic importance that no "major"
can allow a competitor to get between him and his market. For
this and other reasons, a frenzied drive for new supplies persists
while world prices continue to decline.
I THE ARcTIc FRONTIER 3 (R- St. MacDonald ed. 1928).
2 Standard Oil (New Jersey), Royal Dutch Shell, Mobil Oil, Texaco, Gulf Oil,
Standard Oil (California), and British Petroleum.
8 C. TUGENDHAT, OIL: THE BIGGEST BUSINESS 185 (1968).
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A second interesting trait of these companies is their fierce re-
sistance to governmental regulation in the presence of cutthroat
competition. Only in the United States have they allowed govern-
mental interference in the form of a variety of protective statutes to
insulate their business from the rigors of competition. The resultant
inefficiency in production, high costs of domestic consumption,
and minimal taxation of the oil industry has been and is a national
disgrace. Internationally, the operations of these same companies
are highly competitive, and the taxes that these companies pay are
the mainstay of the various producing nations' economies. The
reason for the unhappy American experience is to be found in the
historical development of the industry, and Mr. Tugendhat has per-
formed a commendable job of compressing into one volume a com-
prehensive overview of the oil industry's development from Drake's
first well to the extraction of oil from the Athabascan tar sands of
Alberta.
We cannot get away from the oil industry because in our mul-
tiple roles as consumers, citizens, and lawyers we are constantly
touched by its activities. 'WVhen one shares his habitat with a giant
it behooves him to obtain knowledge of that giant's nature: Living
with even a friendly elephant can be dangerous. Mr. Tugenhat's
book provides a pleasant method of becoming acquainted with the
physiology of one such colossus.
ARNOLD W. REITZE*
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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